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Abstract
This paper presents a very simple model with present biased agents where optimal compen-
sation schedules may be back-loaded, which is a characteristics of wage contracts we often
observe in reality. There is large evidence that workers are often paid less than their marginal
productivity early in their careers, and more than their marginal productivity later. In this
model, back-loaded wage schedules emerge as a commitment device that allows to prevent
sub-optimal consumption and labor supply patterns.
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1 Introduction
In a standard perfectly competitive labor market with full information, workers are paid
their marginal productivity at each point in time. However, there is substantial evidence
that is not consistent with this: the slope of wage profiles tends to be steeper than that of
a worker’s productivity. Wages are often lower than productivity early in a job spell and
in a worker’s career and higher than productivity later. This regularity has been referred
to as the overtaking anomaly (Smith, 2009). While some explanations for this phenomenon
exist in the literature, they do not seem to match the empirical evidence available within a
parsimonious and general set of assumptions.
This short paper develops an extremely simple model with imperfect capital markets and
where the representative agent has present-biased preferences (Laibson, 1994), and looks at
the implication of this type of hyperbolic discounting on equilibrium wage profiles. The
goal of the model is the provide a first outline of the basic mechanism at work; future work
may generalize and enrich the theoretical environment. The main insight of this paper is
that back-loaded wage profiles can appear in equilibrium as a commitment device for time
inconsistent agents, who would otherwise choose labor supply patterns that are ex ante sub-
optimal. A long-term wage contract that includes deferred wages allow time inconsistent
agents to discipline their own future behavior, and in particular labor supply and consump-
tion patterns. Even institutions such as mandatory retirement and actuarially unfair pension
plans (Frey and Jegen, 2001) may be seen as optimal commitment devices to prevent the
agent to consume ‘too much’ and work ‘too little’ (from from an ex ante perspective) early
in her career. It is well recognized that time inconsistent agents have a demand for com-
mitment. To the best of my knowledge, however, the consequences of time inconsistency for
optimal dynamic wage contracts was not previously analyzed.
There is very solid evidence that wages increase in seniority. This phenomenon however,
is likely to be at least partly driven by firm-specific human capital accumulation that affects
productivity as well. The overtaking anomaly instead concerns wage increases that go beyond
productivity gains. Useful evidence must therefore rely on some measure of productivity.
Given the complexity of measuring productivity, this is harder to assess. The evidence may be
divided into direct evidence on preferences for increasing wage profiles, and indirect evidence
on observed wage and productivity patterns. Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) present
direct survey evidence on preferred wage profiles. The modal choice of the respondents of
their survey is a moderately-increasing wage profile, rather than flat or decreasing wage
profiles of the same present value. Duffy and Smith (2013) and Smith (2009) summarize the
evidence for preferences for increasing wages. While this evidence is largely non experimental,
it does suggest that the fact that we observe wages increasing faster than productivity in
reality, may not simply depend on informational and incentive considerations.
A number of different studies from separate streams of the literature are useful to un-
derstand the empirical relevance of the overtaking anomaly. Earlier studies focus on specific
sectors where productivity can be measured. Medoff and Abraham (1980) use data from
two major US corporations, and find wages rising faster than productivity, which they proxy
with the quality of supervisor’s evaluations. Frank and Hutchens (1993) analyze the wage
structures in place for commercial airline pilots and intercity bus drivers. In both cases
wages are sharply increasing in seniority. These occupations provide very insightful evidence
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since they represent cases where productivity or incentive considerations are unlikely to be
very important. Using US data from two large companies that include weekly output per
worker, Lazear (1999) also finds evidence of productivity-unrelated wage increases. Flabbi
and Ichino (2001) look at the case of a large Italian commercial bank and find that on-the-job
tenure increases wages, while productivity appears to decline.
Some recent papers use rich matched employer-employee datasets to offer additional evi-
dence of the existence of back-loaded wage schemes across the labor market. The advantage
of using large matched employer employee datasets is that one can control for unobserved
heterogeneity at the individual and firm level because individuals are followed over time
across establishments. It is thereby possible to estimate worker productivity without ob-
serving it directly. Using US panel data, Hellerstein and Neumark (2007) find evidence of
backloaded wage payment schemes estimating productivity from firm-level production func-
tions. Fukao et al. (2006) estimate wage-tenure and productivity-tenure profiles for Japan.
They find that the estimated wage-tenure profile has a higher slope than the productivity-
tenure profile and that wages are lower than productivity at low levels of tenure, and are
higher than productivity at higher levels of tenure. Dostie (2011), using Canadian data,
also finds evidence of wage increases that are not consistent with productivity patterns, in
particular for older high skilled workers.
Researchers have put forward a number of explanations for these findings. Existing
theories can be roughly divided into those focusing on agency dynamics in the context of
asymmetric information and moral hazard, and those postulating that there may be direct
preferences for increasing wage profiles. Probably the most commonly-cited explanations
for delayed payment contracts is within the early agency theory literature. In the context
of costly monitoring of individual effort, Lazear (1981) and Lazear (1999) develop models
where a wage contract that entails deferred payments can ensure higher levels of efforts by
the agent by increasing the cost of shirking, while making it cheaper for the firm to monitor.
In a related contribution, Salop and Salop (1976) present a model where employers face firing
costs and workers are of different types, which are private information of the workers and
represent different exogenous probability of quitting. An increasing wage profile can emerge
as an optimal device for screening workers of different types. A mechanism that is key to
this literature is that stochastic monitoring of individual effort is possible and can result in
dismissal of the worker. Delayed wages will not occur if workers can be monitored perfectly,
or if firing costs are very high.
Behavioral theories, such as Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991), focus on the role of pref-
erences for the emergence of increasing wag contracts. Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991)
argue that workers may exhibit a preference for increasing wage profiles even at the cost of a
lower present value, discussing a number of possible reasons why that may be the case. Some
of the proposed explanations include deriving utility from the feeling of mastery associated
with increasing wages, utility from anticipation, irrational ”errors”. Frank and Hutchens
(1993) assume that agents have inherent preferences for increasing consumption streams
and thus for increasing payments, i.e. exhibit negative discounting. However, there is very
large evidence that this assumptions does not hold empirically in many different contexts.
Reference-dependent preferences may result in a preference for wage increases, as in Grund
and Sliwka (2007). Cabrales et al. (2008) show that a model in which workers have social
preferences may generate “productivity-unrelated wage increase”. Workers experiencing pro-
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ductivity declines will have their wages increased. Smith (2009) postulate workers’ costs of
effort to be higher when previous wages were lower, driven by individual cognitive dissonance
playing a role in their choices.
The model below discusses the consequences of present-biased preferences for optimal
wage schedules. This offers a very parsimonious explanation of the overtaking anomaly. It
does not rely on informational asymmetries, which confines the relevance of the overtaking
anomaly to specific contexts, which are hard to reconcile with its broad empirical relevance.
It also does not add arguments to the utility function in order to derive the results. I specify
preferences similarly to Laibson (1994) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). A present-biased
preference structure is a special case of the larger family of preferences exhibits hyperbolic
discounting, i.e. preferences by which the agent discounts two subsequent periods different
depending on how far in the future they are. There is large empirical support from the lab
and the field for non-exponential time discounting. Meier and Sprenger (2010) conduct a
large field study to investigate the stability of preferences. They find that over a third of the
participants exhibit behavior consistent with hyperbolic discounting. Ashraf et al. (2006)
find similar proportions of present-biased individuals, and offer also a detailed review of the
relevant literature.
2 The model
This section develops a very simple model in which agents’ preferences may not satisfy the
assumption of a constant discount factor. The analysis then derives optimal compensation
schedules for the time consistent and time inconsistent cases.
2.1 Agent owning and operating
I first consider an economy made up of only one agent. There are three periods t = 1, 2, 3.
The usual technicality of treating an agent that may have time inconsistent preferences as
a series of different time-dated agents is adopted here for simplicity. In other words, the
model below can be interpreted as a model where agents live for one period only and have
preferences over consumption levels of future agents, as in a standard model with dynasties.
Preferences The goal of the assumption on preferences is to keep the analytics as simple
as possible, while isolating the dynamics that are of interest and providing the key insight. A
more general model is left for future research. Agent 3 (living at time t = 3 has preferences:
u(c3) (1)
Agent 2 has preferences:
u(c2)− αn2 + δu(c3) (2)
Agent 1 (alive in period t = 1) has preferences:
− αn1 + u(c2)− αn2 + u(c3) (3)
4
where cj denotes the consumption allocated to agent j = 1, 2, 3 and nj ∈ {0, 1} is the
labor expended by agent j = 1, 2. This structure is simplified here, its purpose is simply
to illustrate the basic insight of the paper in the simplest way. Assume that 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
and that at t = 3 the agent cannot work, so that n3 = 0 by assumption. Assume also that
u′′ < 0 < u′ and that u(0) = −∞. Note that unless δ = 1 these preferences imply that the
discount factor between period 2 and period 3 is different according to the preferences of
agent 1 and agent 2. Allowing agent 1 to be present biased as well, or including c1 in the
utility function of agent 0 would not qualitatively change any of the results below. Both are
assumed purely for convenience.1
Technologies There is a production technology f(n) = yn and a storage technology with
no depreciation, such that output can be carried from one period to the next at no cost.2
Agent 1 in full control In this section, we assume that there is a commitment technology
available to agent 1. Agent 1 choice problem involves the maximization of (3) subject to
c3 + s3 ≤ s2
c2 + s2 ≤ yn2 + s1
c1 + s1 ≤ yn1
where sj ≥ 0 denotes output stored at date j, j = 1, 2, 3. By monotonicity of the utility
function, the constraints above will be satisfied with equality in equilibrium. By (1), any
solution will have s3 = 0 and c1 = 0, and thus c3 = s2 and s1 = yn1.
Using these results and substituting the constraints into the objective function the prob-
lem of agent 1 is then equivalent to choosing present and future optimal labor supply:
max
n1,n2
[−αn1 + u(yn2 + yn1 − s2)− αn2 + u(s2)] (4)
Assume that α is sufficiently small so that (n1, n2) = (1, 1) is optimal from the perspective of
agent 1.3 Then, the optimal choice for s2, namely s
∗
2, is characterised by u
′(2y− s∗2) = u′(s∗2)
so that
s∗1 = s
∗
2 = y (5)
c∗2 = c
∗
3 = y (6)
equating consumption between period 2 and period 3.
Sequentially-rational solution Let us now consider the case in which agent 1 cannot
commit to an intertemporal plan for consumption and labor supply. The solution thus needs
1Equivalent, one could add a fourth initial period in which the contract is signed but no labor is supplied.
2One could assume that there is a credit market with zero interest rate and that the agents faces a
borrowing constraint.
3Welfare statements in a world of time inconsistency depend on the relative weights given to the different
time-dated agents.
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to be sequentially rational, i.e. needs to be the result of a maximisation program of agent
2 and agent 3, as well as agent 1. We therefore need to apply backward induction. At
t = 3 agent 3 is in control. She will optimally (and trivially) choose to consume whatever
is available, so that cˆ3 = s2, obtaining a payoff of u(s2). At t = 2 agent 2 is in control and
takes s1 as given. Conditionally on n2, the problem of agent 2 is:
v(s1, n2) ≡ max
s2
u(s1 + yn2 − s2)− αn2 + δu(s2) (7)
with the solution satisfying u′(s1 + yn2 − sˆ2) = δu′(sˆ2). Clearly, this solution is different
from s∗2 that agent 1 would choose. First of all, even conditional on n2 = 1, cˆ2 > cˆ3 insofar
as δ < 1. Secondly, the choice of n2(s1) need also to be considered. If s1 is sufficiently large,
agent 1 may choose n2 = 0. Assume that for s1 = y this is the case. Even agent 1 may then
decide not to work to elicit n2 > 0. In other words, even if α is sufficiently small so that
(n1, n2) = (1, 1) is optimal from agent 1 perspective, this need not be the case for agent 2.
Irrespective of nˆ2, the sequentially optimal solution is
sˆ1 = y (8)
cˆ2 > cˆ3 (9)
Therefore, the sequentially-rational solution for this economy is suboptimal from the per-
spective of agent 1 (and that of agent 3). This in turn implies that agent 1 has a demand for
a commitment technology: agent 1 is willing to pay for a technology that distorts agent 2’s
choices away from the sequentially rational equilibrium towards the equilibrium in equation
(6). Below, I provide an example of how such a technology may look like.
2.2 One worker, one firm
Agent 1 can pass control of the production technology to another agent (the firm) by making a
take-it-or-leave-it offer. The firm then hires agent 1 for a wage schedule (w1, w2(n2), w3(n2)).
Assume that the firm can commit to the offered wage schedule. Agent 1, on the other hand,
cannot commit to work in the future, so that the equilibrium wage schedule needs to be
sequentially rational. Wage payments are inalienable, and thus that future wage payments
cannot be used as collateral. Consider the following back-loaded wage schedule:
w1 = 0
w2(n1 = 1, n2 = 1) = w3(n1 = 1, n2 = 1) = y
w2(n1 = 0 ∨ n2 = 0) = w3(n1 = 0 ∨ n2 = 0) = 0
 (10)
This wage schedule is feasible, in the sense that it lies within the production possibility set
of this economy. Next, I check whether it is desirable from the perspective of agent 1, and
sequentially rational. At time t = 1, agent 1 faces the same problem as in the scenario of full
control analyzed above. He will therefore set n1 = 1 to avoid losing future wage payments.
4
4In case of n0 = 0 we should consider renegotiation of the wage contract at time t = 1. This can be
ignored by observing that this wage schedule reaches the first best for agent 1, and so deviations cannot be
welfare-improving from the perspective of agent 1.
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At time t = 2, agent 2 works and consumes the received wage y completely. At time t = 3,
agent 3 receives y as wage (pension) payment, and consumes it all.
The allocation obtained is the same as that obtained as the solution to the problem where
agent 1 is in full control, equation (6). It is therefore optimal from the perspective of agent
1. As a consequence, agent 1 will decide to pass control of the production technology to
the firm. Note that inalienability of wages is optimal from the perspective of agent 1, as it
prevents agent 2 from over-consumption through borrowing.
Time consistent case For δ = 1, the wage schedule analyzed above is feasible and
(weakly) optimal. In fact, a quasi-Ricardian results hold, by which the ”first-best” allo-
cation (from the perspective of agent 1) can be achieved with a wide variety of contracts:{
w1 + w2(n1 = 1, n2 = 1) + w3(n1 = 1, n2 = 1) = 2y
w1 + w2(n1 = 1, n2 = 1) ≥ y
}
(11)
Optimal wage schedules in this case can be front-loaded, constant, or back-loaded. The
first row of equation (11) represents the usual Ricardian result. The second row of equation
(11) adds a second condition, which comes from the inalienability of wages: excessively
backloaded wages cannot be optimal. The same allocation can also be achieved with the
agent operating the firm directly. Therefore, in the case of δ = 1 at time t = 1 agent 1
is just indifferent between passing the control of the production technology to the firm, or
operating the technology, having no demand for commitment.
Time inconsistent agent Equation (10) is the unique wage schedule that achieves agent-
1’s first best in the case of δ < 1. Every other wage schedule that is optimal for δ = 1 results
in c2 > c3, which is sub-optimal from the perspective of agent 1. This uniqueness result
holds for any δ < 1, which means that any arbitrarily small degree of time inconsistency
results in a back-loaded wage schedule as the unique optimal compensation schedule.
The wage schedule in (10) provides incentive for agent 2 to work, and provides an upper
bound on agent 2’s consumption. This result is an illustration of the overtaking anomaly.
Under (10), the worker is paid less than her productivity early in his career, the same as
her productivity at some point in her career and more than her productivity in the end
of his/her career (one can think of t = 3 in the model as retirement). The wage profile
presented above relies on the ability by the worker to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to pass
control to the firm at t = 1. This is equivalent to assuming that the worker has all of the
bargaining power and the firm has none. If this assumption does not hold, the firm will be
able to exploit the demand for commitment and can offer a wage contract that has lower
life-time wages but will nevertheless be accepted by the worker. Ceteris paribus, for a non-
degenerate bargaining share, the larger is the time inconsistency problem of the agent, the
larger will be the expected profit of the principal, because the agent is willing to pay more
for the commitment device he is offered. Calculating equilibrium wage contracts for different
assumptions on the market structure is beyond the scope of this short paper.
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3 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces a very simple model offering an explanation for the overtaking anomaly,
i.e. the tendency for wages to increase more than productivity during a worker’s career. Time
inconsistent agents will accept back-loaded wage schedules with lower present value as a com-
mitment device that helps them choose the ex-ante optimal labor supply and consumption
levels. This result has been derived for a one-agent economy, and then generalized to a
context where the presence of a firm is derived endogenously, as a response to a demand for
commitment by agents. The first-best (from the perspective of the initial agent) can then be
achieved as a sequential equilibrium. In the scenario analyzed here, even a negligible degree
of time inconsistency can generate back-loaded wage profiles, and positive expected profits
for the firm. The expected profits of the firm depend positively on the degree of time incon-
sistency of the agent. Illiquid assets such as publicly managed pension plans and mandatory
retirement age may be viewed an extreme example of deferred compensation. Back-loaded
wages prevent excessive consumption as well as from insufficient labor supply. The goal of
this note was to present the simplest explanation of this mechanism. More rigorous modeling
and complex applications are left for future research.
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